In the latest round of “let’s do everything the dumbest way possible” the two nations in the world sharing the most in common keep taking to social media to fantasize going to war with each other.
It is deeply annoying, brings out the worst tendencies on both sides, and (to my mind worst of all) illustrates no one understands the Operational Art of War!
Americans take to social media and claim Canada doesn’t have a military, the military wouldn’t fight and be so outnumbered that resistance would collapse within hours.
Canadians usually agree the conventional war would be over in an afternoon, but then America would face a long and bloody insurgency (just wait till Uncle Sam meets the Maple Mujahedeen!).
Both of these answers are tedious and reflect a profound misunderstanding of military matters. But since this deeply tedious subject refuses to die, here is my assessment:
There will be no widespread Canadian resistance to US occupation;
A US invasion would be, by near pear warfare standards, a walk over; but
A near peer walkover would still mean a 2-4 week war where the US would suffer about 1x GWOT’s worth of casualties a week.
In the first post, I will look at Canada’s situation. The Maple Mujaheddin Insurgency is not going to happen. However, Canada’s military is a small but potent force that would fight if ordered to do so.
The second post will look at what military power America could bring to bear against Canada.
The third post will wargame an invasion and explain why I predict a 2 -4 week war where the US suffers 1x GWOT’s worth of casualties per week.
There Won’t Be a Maple Mujahadeen
If the United States annexes Canada, there will not be a long-standing violent insurrection by a nation of hunters. The Maple Mujahadeen isn’t going to happen.
A successful insurgency has several requirements:
A pre-existing structure to organize around;
The structure having access to weapons;
The insurgent group not having a future in the new regime; and
The broader population being willing to shelter the insurgency.
Canada does have factions that meet all four of these factors, but spread across different factions. Like any complex modern society, Canada does have pre-existing structures of voluntary organizations. Virtually none of them are organized around any kind of collective defense or skills that easily translate to an insurgency.
For #2 (access to weapons) you either need armed citizens, government weapons cashes or weapons brought in by a rival power supporting the insurgency. In Canada’s case, the only viable supply of weapons for an insurgency is its armed citizens. As with most statistics, Canada only looks like a gun free country because it’s beside America.
The graph below shows the top 10 countries for estimated firearms per 100 people, plus the EU and global average for comparison (excluding countries with a population under one million). Countries that were recently warzones are in orange, as their rate of firearm ownership is something of a special case.
The number for Canada is likely too low. This is based on a 2017 data set, and firearm ownership is growing faster than the population. It also assumes there are five unregistered firearms to every registered firearm in Canada. The last time Canada had hard data on unregistered firearms (2003 to 2012) the ratio was 10:1. Assuming a similar ratio today, firearms per 100 jumps to 1/2 that of America and nearly 4x the European average.
However, Canada has much more culturally, geographically and politically divided gun ownership than America. Nearly half of Canadian households in rural areas and small towns have firearms. In large urban areas (where 80% of Liberal Party voters live) household firearm ownership is 1.2%.
Although there isn’t enough data to accurately state percentages, there is survey data showing what professions are most likely and least likely to be firearm owners in Canada:
The geographic, cultural and political division between firearm owners and non-owners is much more stark in Canada than it is in America. Canadians and Americans who live in rural areas or small towns almost the same firearm ownership rates. But urban Americans are nearly 17x more likely to own a firearm than urban Canadians.
There’s therefore a very clear archetype of firearm owners in Canada. They live in the country or a small town, work in resource extraction and they are fiscally and socially conservative. This is also the type of Canadian that is least likely to be pushed towards the insurgency camp. Resource extraction workers are the least likely to be negatively impacted by a U.S. occupation. This archetypical firearm holder is also the type Canadian that is culturally the most similar to an American. The organizations they belong to that could form a framework for an insurgency are some of the few organizations taking America’s side in the current trade dispute.
On the other hand, the archetype of a Canadian most likely to be part of the insurgency is an urban liberal who’s employed in social work or the media. They are the most likely to be shocked by the difference in the American way of life and the most likely to lose their livelihood following U.S. occupation. None of them own guns. While this urban group may be willing to harbor insurgents, those insurgents would live in a totally different part of the country.
Therefore, the Maple Mujahideen is pure fantasy. The people with guns will be angry about U.S. occupation, but not furious to the point of being ideologically motivated to start an insurgency. The firearm owners are also the Canadians most likely to financially benefit from a U.S. takeover. There is a group of Canadians who would react to US occupation with a level of rage and defiance that is difficult to overstate. However, none of them have guns. These two groups can’t even cooperate because they live in totally different parts of the country.
The Military Will Fight if Ordered
A common retort is that Canada’s military won’t fight. It’s a rainbow DEI make work project incapable of withstanding the rigors of modern warfare, and the soldiers have no loyalty to the government.
First, IF ethnic homogeneity is your metric for military effectiveness then I have some bad news; Canada’s military is a lot less ‘diverse’ than America’s:1
Second, the claim that a generation or a culture has become too decadent to fight is a very old one. During the two decades leading up to WW1 the dominant socio-military academic movement was a believe the coddled youth of industrial societies were no longer capable of withstanding modern warfare.2 At the height of this movement’s popularity an entire generation obediently went off to the slaughter of a four-year attritional war.
This idea persists. Here’s a quote from Brigadier Thompson shortly after the retaking of the Falkland Islands in 1982:
“Before we came down here, a lot of people were saying that the youth of today had gone soft, that they were too coddled, and that they couldn't handle warfare. Well, they've proven that they're just as tough as their fathers and grandfathers were. They are magnificent.”
Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there was a similar view that the Ukrainians were unlikely to fight a protracted war, as they were an ethnically divided nation with an unpopular government. A December 2021 survey (2 months prior to the invasion) found only 33.3% of Ukrainians were willing to resist a Russian invasion with arms.
Third, and most importantly, this mostly illustrates how little civilian armchair generals understand the military. In a professional military during wartime, the popularity of the government and current politics has surprisingly little impact. The cliche is “soldiers don’t fight for ideology, they fight for the man on the left and the man on their right.” This is true, but in a way that’s rarely understood by civilians.
In professional military, a unit becomes a surrogate family. Order is maintained by a cadre of NCOs, who make sure the orders of officers are obeyed. Members of the unit are given a shared identity and indoctrinated into a military culture that strips individualism. We tell everyone that it isn’t brainwashing, but let’s be honest, it’s brainwashing. People don’t risk their lives without brainwashing. To skirt around this reality, we use the term indoctrination rather than brainwashing.
The end result of this process is a loyalty to the unit that almost entirely excludes political questions. If a battalion is holding a hill soldiers who have been indoctrinated are unlikely to desert until that battalion has suffered serious casualties. This has nothing to do with their loyalty to the nation to desert is to betray your family.
It would shock civilians how rarely politics and ideology are discussed in a volunteer professional army. Saying something like, “I volunteered to fight for my country,” is considered incredibly cringe. Most of us feel that way on some level, but we keep it to ourselves because we would be mercilessly teased if we said it out loud. There’s a reason “for my countreeee” became such a meme. In a professional military you have to say that sarcastically to avoid being bullied.
There’s also practical realities about desertion that aren’t understood. Once a unit is activated a soldier is never alone. Once you are in the field, at a minimum you will be sharing a trench with a fireteam partner. You can kill or incapacitate your fire team partner, but that’s harming a member of your family. Your other option is to convince your fire team partner to desert with you. But if your persuasive powers are insufficient, the fire team partner will report you to the chain of command, who can have you imprisoned or executed. There are more opportunities to desert or surrender during battle, but every soldier who attempts this runs a not insignificant chance of getting killed in the process.
So if Canada has an indoctrinated professional military then it will fight, at least until it has suffered significant casualties.
The Capabilities of the Canadian Military
Number of Personnel
Canada’s military is much smaller military than the United States, even accounting for our smaller population. However, the numbers thrown around online for the size of the Canadian military (I usually see 23,000 or 68,000) are significant understatements.
The regular force currently has 68,327 personnel out of an authorized strength of 71,500. It’s often claimed the Canadian Army only has 23,000 soldiers. This is the number of regular force members posted to positions that fall under the Canadian Army command, which is very different from the number of soldiers in the Canadian military.
Canada organizes a lot of its supporting roles in organizations outside the Army, but permanently attached to army formations. This includes the medical, most communications, intelligence, headquarters staff, MPs, and some logistics positions. A large proportion of the training schools also fall outside the Army. Finally, Canada’s Special Forces Command is not part of the Army. This has two battalion sized ground units (JTF 2 which is a SAS equivalent and CSOR which is a Ranger battalion equivalent).
Canada’s regular force has 23,000 of these positions, which don’t fall under the Army, Navy, or Air Force. However, the large majority of these positions are filled by soldiers.
The Army Reserve has 19,776 soldiers, but there are also 3,153 purple reserve positions, which are almost all soldiers.
Canada also has a branch called the Rangers. Think rangers like Strider in the LOTR or park rangers, not the US Army Rangers. They are a light reconnaissance and pioneer (meaning light engineering) force that operates in Canada’s most remote and northern regions. They’re often made fun of for having goofy-looking uniforms and sharing a name with US Special Forces. However, I assure you, no one who has trained with them makes fun of them. They are a mix of ‘mountain men’ from isolated towns of under 1,000 people and Inuit warriors, all of which can live off the land in some of the most hostile terrain in the world.
So if you add up everyone and categorize them by US categories:
The Canadian Army has about 69,000 soldiers
The Royal Canadian Navy has about 15,900 sailors
The Royal Canadian Air Force has about 17,900 airmen
For a total of 102,809 uniformed personnel (with an authorized strength of about 108,000).
If Canada had 30 to 60 days’ notice of an invasion, they have two other sources of manpower. The supplemental reserve is made up of soldiers who released from the military but agreed to be called up in time of war. Canada also has the equivalent of a stop-loss system where anyone who was non-medically discharged in the last two years can be recalled in time of war. If these two options were exercised, Canadian military strength would rise to 123,209. This would make the post recall strength of the army about 85,500.
The Air Battle
This can be dealt with quickly as the Royal Canadian Air Force would not play much of a role in the defense of Canada from US invasion.
The RCAF has 361 fixed-wing aircraft and 146 helicopters. Given Canada’s population, it’s a tolerably well-resourced Air Force, but it’s built for the wrong role. The RCAF’s strength is providing surveillance and logistically supporting force projection around the world and in the high arctic.
For air superiority, Canada has 92x F/A-18s that are operational. They have been upgraded to be as capable, or nearly as capable, as America’s 4.5 generation fighters; though they have very high flight hours, giving them lower serviceability rates. There are also 20-33 F’A-18s are in storage at 4th generation standard.
The problem is the U.S. military has 1,001x 4.5 generation fighters and 994x 5th generation fighters, and 4.5 generation fighters can’t realistically contest airspace against 5th generation fighters.
Canada has begun training on the first batch of 16x F-35s, but they will not be based in Canada until early 2028. Canada will eventually have 30-88x F-35s. If the F-35 order is below the 88x initially planned Canada would buy a larger number of Saab Gripens to bring the fighter fleet over 100.
None of these options would change the futility of Canada seriously resisting a U.S. air superiority campaign.
The Naval Battle
This can also be dealt with quickly, as the Royal Canadian Navy would not play a significant role during an American invasion.
By warship aggregate displacement (134,000 tons) Canada has the 20th largest navy in the world. If you remove navies with obsolete warships (like Egypt, Chile and Indonesia) the RSN likely ranks 13-15th. Given Canada’s population and economy, this is ok, but not great.
Almost all the RCN ships are near the end of their lifespan. Canada is in the middle of a shipbuilding program that will about double the RCN’s warship tonnage to 250,000 to 290,000 tons, but this will take until 2040.
The RCN of 2040 will be a much more capable fleet, but the USN has an aggregate warship tonnage of 8,265,000. No amount of naval procurement by Canada can change the inevitability of the USN quickly winning any naval campaign.
Maneuver Unit Organization
However, as has been recently relearned against Iran, air power and naval power are not decisive. To defeat a nation in anything less than a few years requires a ground invasion by maneuver units.
As mentioned earlier, Canada has a brigade (-) Special Forces that includes a Tier 1 battalion sized unit (JTF2) and a Tier 2 battalion sized unit (CSOR).
In September the Army reorganizing from regional divisions to task based divisions. The maneuver units will be in a mechanized infantry division called the Maneuver Division and a light infantry division called the Defense of Canada Division.
The Maneuver Division holds most of the regular army. It has three mechanized brigades (CMBGs). Each CMBG has 2x mechanized, 1x airmobile and 1x armoured battalions, along with all the normal supporting units.
A CMBG is somewhat larger than the equivalent American Brigade Combat Team. CMBGs have 4,700 to 5,800 soldiers, whereas US BCTs have 4,200 to 4,500. This is because assets held at the divisional and corps level in the U.S. Army are pushed down to CMBGs in the Canadian Army.
There is also a combat support brigade with division level signals, electronic warfare, multi-domain (drones and radar) and military intelligence battalions.
The Defence of Canada division is tasked with domestic operations and defending the arctic from Russian incursions. Sometime after September, the three air mobile infantry battalions in the CMBGs will transfer to the Defense of Canada division, as the Light Regiment. The Light Regiment is a high readiness airmobile force for reinforcing the Arctic or conducting overseas contingency operations (similar to the 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain divisions’ roles in the US Army).
The Defence of Canada division also has the Ranger brigade and the 10x Canadian Brigade Groups (CBGs) of the army reserve. A CBG is about 1/2 the size of a CMBG. Their strengths range from 1,200 to 3,000, but almost all have 2,500 soldiers. The CMBG is not a field deployable formation. It generates a Territorial Battalion Group (in US parlance a Task Force based around a light infantry battalion). Below is an example of a TBG ORBAT when organized for warfighting. A CBG is mandated to go from normal peacetime operations to mobilizing the TBG in under 72 hours.
Currently, TBGs have four maneuver sub-units. It takes about 800 soldiers to fill out the ORBAT above, which is well below the 1,200 to 3,000 soldiers in a CBG. The TBG was designed on the assumption only some of the CBGs soldiers could get time off from their civilian jobs to volunteer during something like a natural disaster. In the event of an invasion the entire CBG would be mobilized. This would result in a ORBATs with 6+ maneuver sub-units.
This organization is a too large to be workable, so with enough time the Canadian Army would convert the 10x oversized TBGs to 5-6x infantry brigades, create local garrisons to defend key objectives and/or attach excess sub-units to the CMBGs.
Equipment
Until 2026, the Canadian military spent significantly less per service member than the US military. This was mostly been due to investing less in equipment for the Navy, Airforce and the highest end Army items (like tanks and air defence). Canada now spends slightly more per service member than the United States, but it will take several years for the new equipment purchases to come online.
Below the level of high-end items, the US and Canadian ground forces are remarkably similar. The same factory in London, Ontario built the USMC LAV-25, the US Army’s Stryker and the Canadian LAV-6.
For both the US and Canadian armies the standard artillery piece is either a 155mm M-777 or a 105mm light gun. For both armies3 an infantry platoon’s firearms are a M-260 medium machine gun, 6x M-249 SAWs, 6x M-203 grenade launchers and a fully automatic variant of the AR-15 rifle.
America has more artillery and tanks per brigade. Canada has more armored vehicles per brigade. The other differences are minor in the grand scheme of things. Generally speaking, at the company and battalion level, the Canadian Army has a slightly less expensive and Gucci version of what’s in the American Army.
Online tables showing holdings of military equipment make the US Army look much better equipped, but this is mostly because by the US Army maintaining large supplies of excess equipment from the Cold War. For example, the US Army has 4,640 tanks, but:
2,000 are mothballed in storage
1,248 are stored at high readiness in warehouses around the world (mostly Europe, Kuwait and Japan)
1,392 are in operational units
This means the US Army has more than four times as many tanks than Canada per 1,000 soldiers. But Canada and the US Army have a similar scale of operational tanks assigned to units.
The pre-positioned and mothballed tanks are important for fighting globally or fighting a long war, but they are irrelevant in a short war (like an invasion of Canada).
On a Unit for Unit Basis the US and Canadian Militaries are Peers
Canada has a long and storied military history, but the relevance of this history is overstated. The model of how the Canadian military functions has changed drastically between the War of 1812, World War I, World War II, the Cold War and post-Cold War, so I’m not a fan of pointing to Vimy Ridge as a metric.
The backbone of Canadian military effectiveness its service members. It is a professional volunteer force that, despite all of the frustrating bureaucracies inherent in every military, values excellence and getting the job done. This is true of all militaries in the Anglosphere. It’s not a coincidence that the Anglosphere militaries work well together, think in similar ways and have a lot of respect for each other.
Compared to the US, the Canadian military is underfunded for equipment. It makes up for this through longer periods of service. The chart below shows the average Canadian NCM spends nearly twice as long in uniform. The average for officers also serves significantly longer.
Why do Canadians stay in uniform longer? It’s easier to maintain esprit de corps in a smaller organization. We dick our troops around less (I won’t say we don’t do it, but it happens less). We don’t have an “up or out” promotion system for officers. This increases the officer experience level and troops are less likely to serve under a career hungry sociopath (I won’t say it doesn’t happen, but it happens less).
Most of all, the pay is much better. The graph below shows pay at various ranks, with Canadian salaries adjusted to USD.
Officers do slightly better in Canada than the US, but there’s an enormous gap in NCM pay. A Canadian E1 (a Private in boot camp) earns just $154 per month less than a US Army E6 (Staff Sergeant). A Canadian E4 (Corporal) earns nearly as much as an American O3 (Captain). Canadian salaries average about 73% of US salaries, so the gap between soldier's salaries and private sector pay is even higher.
The effect of these longer service lengths is roughly the equivalently of having everyone in a unit able to work at one or two rank levels lower than in the US Army.
One statistically provable effect of this higher average experience is Canadian’s dominance of long range sniping. Prior to the 20234 for the top 10 longest range sniper kills number 1, 3 and 4 were Canadians:
Overall, the anglosphere nations have militaries that are all in a similar world class tier. We work well together because we think relatively similarly. We have professional volunteer armies that value excellence. While it’s hard to quantify this sort of thing, claiming the Canadian military is ineffective, almost universally comes from Americans who haven’t served alongside Canadians.5
To give a bit of a flavor of what I mean, here are a few quotes from American commanders about the Canadian military:
“The Canadian military is an incredibly capable force. When you stand shoulder-to-shoulder with them, you know you have an absolute professional next to you. They punch well above their weight class, and their actions in Afghanistan proved that they are among the finest soldiers in the world.”
General Raymond Odierno, October 2014
"The professionalism of the Canadian Forces is unquestioned, and they remain one of our most capable partners."
General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 2012
"The U.S. Army shares an ironclad partnership with the Canadian Army. Our soldiers train together, fight together, and serve side-by-side around the world. We share a common vision of a safe and secure world, and the professionalism of Canadian soldiers is unmatched."
General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, May 2022
So you can:
Claim there are 23,000 people in the Canadian military, but it’s actually 102,809.
Bloviate online about limp wristed Canadian soldiers, but the US Army disagrees with you.
Claim professional soldiers weigh political and moral questions before deciding whether to fight, but this only shows you don’t understand how professional volunteer armies function.
Claim the Canadian Army doesn’t have weapons, but it essentially has the same equipment as the US Army.
Of course a military of 102,809 is tiny compared the US Military’s 2.1 million service members, but we will address that in the next two articles.
Conclusion
The Maple Mujahadeen isn’t going to happen. Canada has a much starker geographic and cultural divide between gun owners and non-gun owners. Rural and small town Canada have nearly the same rate of gun ownership as rural and small town Americans. Urban Canadian gun owners statistically do not exist. The gun owners in Canada are the least likely to economically suffer from a US occupation, and are the group who would have the least changes in their way of life.
The groups who would be economically and ideologically displaced from power by a US occupation don’t own guns, don’t know anyone who owns guns and don’t live anywhere near anyone who owns guns.
On the other hand, Canada has a small but capable military that would fight to the point of heavy casualties if ordered to do so. The explanations as to why the Canadian military wouldn’t fight do not hold water, and reflect a misunderstanding of how volunteer professional militaries work.
The Canadian military has 102,809 uniformed personnel, with the ability to surge to 123,209 on about 30 days notice. In the event of a US invasion the RCAF and RCN would quickly be destroyed. But for victory in a short war the US would need a ground invasion.
The Canadian Army had about 69,000 soldiers, and could surge to about 85,500 with 30 days notice. This is enough to properly staff 2x special forces battalions, 3x mechanized brigades, the equivalent of 5x light infantry brigades and an arctic patrol brigade. Lacks much of the high level enablers of the US military, but at the brigade level and below the equipment is broadly the same. The average Canadian NCM also has nearly twice the experience of their American counterpart, with this higher retention driven by cultural differences and much higher rates of pay.
You typically find statistics showing both militaries have similar visible minority percentages. This is because the Canadian military counts Hispanics as visible minorities, whereas the US military typically categorizes Hispanics as white.
This wasn’t a fringe movement. In 1893 the foundational book for this movement (Max Nordau’s “Degeneration”) was an international best seller.
Ignoring the partially implemented M-7 rollout in the US Army.
Reportedly Ukrainian snipers exceeded the 2017 record once in 2023 (3,800m) and again in 2025 (4,000m). However, this hasn’t had the same external verification, the equipment used does not seem to be technically capable of what’s claimed, and the claims are in suspicious round numbers.
In experienced Canadian soldiers similarly make jokes about the US Army until they work with them.
I don't think the American public would tolerate the United States invading Canada. If Trump ordered an invasion of Canada there would be a significant number of Americans going to their aid. It would turn into a North American Civil War.
One thing you didn't mention is that our elites would fare well with an American takeover. They have too much to lose, and if the Yanks did invade, they'd negotiate with a view to ensuring they'd be at the top of the food chain in whatever new system existed. It's all about money for these folks. It always has been.
As long as the 300 families that are the Laurentian elite continued to receive special treatment, they wouldn't lift a finger. Oh, they'd complain about it, but at the end of the day, the Americans would make it worth their while.
And once they're on board, the average citizen doesn't stand a chance - just look at the truckers. The elites (led by Trudeau - a Laurentian-ite if there ever was one) worked the system masterfully to take down the convoys' leaders and disperse the protest. We're nearly five years on, and Convoy leaders are still taking it in the neck legally. What average Canadian could resist this and fight the Americans?
I think Northern Ireland is a great comparator. If you look at the reasons the IRA resisted, you don't see many similarities in Canada. There is no cohesive ethnic group. We haven't suffered for any significant period of time where a reserve of resentment has built up. There's been no radicalization moment or event(s) to galvanize Canadians (no Bloody Sunday or the like).
As much as I'd hate to admit it, we've got along pretty well with the Yanks, and we're pretty similar to them - at the end of the day, I think most Canadians (with the exception of Quebec) might say, would it be so bad being a part of the USA?