Great analysis. One omission though is where to get the sealift to run the logistics of operating the equivalent of the entire US military in Iran. That may well be the biggest Achilles heel.
I'm going to be covering that in the Wargaming a conflict with Russia series.
Given an Iranian invasion would be mostly IBCTs there's less need for that than you might think. Particularly if they can use Turkey or Iraq to mount the invasion, as they have about 8 brigades worth of equipment already in Europe (which can get to Turkey by Rail) and Kuwait. IBCTs can be flown into theatre by C-17.
The terrain in Iran's north west along Turkey is mountainous. Staging in Turkey will be inefficient. The axis into Iran from Turkey is full of choke points, and would lead to a logistical tail vulnerable to interdiction and harrassment.
Due to Iran's rugged terrain, they rely on a relatively small number of transit chokepoints, if these are severed it will greatly complicate their ability to move supplies and manpower around. Worth doing an analysis of this. It features strongly in the US militaries war plans for any potential conflict with Iran
Simplicius did a good write up of the Iraq war myth
Most countries maintain what are called operational research departments. They turn historical information from past conflicts into data sets in order to run statistical analysis.
The first big thing that almost all of them arrived at was the 3:1 ratio at the tactical level.
Thier work is usually classified when covering more recent conflicts. So for instance, US operational data analysis from the 1973 Yohm Kippur War is just starting to be available, but 100% the Pentagon is currently very busy crunching the numbers from Ukraine.
Whilst the fallout from this sort of operation would be catastrophic globally, on one level, I would love to see them try. I cannot think of a swifter method of bringing the US Empire and it’s Zionist entity colony down in a matter of months. Go for it USA, I say. - make our day! 👍
I think it might be optimistic to assume the same force quality ratio as 1991 against Iraq. And equally, to assume the same morale level of the defenders.
Invasion is the easy (ish) bit - the real question is what is done when you win and then own a country descending into chaos. I wonder if there are any recent examples of this…
Thanks for the interesting and informative article. The force ratio discussion was especially useful. The 1:3 rule often used simplistically, and the article does a good job of explaining it. Looking forward to the next article.
Great analysis. However the drohne cemtric war in Ukraine seems to favour the defender as maneuvering becomes very hard when your enemy sees every move and can strike everything he sees. How do you see the influence of this on the calculation?
Second question: To defeat Iran, the US would also have to occupy significant parts of it. When you take 20 solidiers for each 1000 civilians under occupation the 90 Millions inhabitants of Iran would need an occupation force of 1.8 Million solidiers, which is way out of the capabilities of US military. How would this play out?
Those both point to the asymmetric aspect of Iran's national defense strategy. I generally think the impact of drones is overrated for reasons that would take a whole separate article to cover.
Whether the insurgency strategy would work depends a lot on how well national will to resist survives in the occupied parts of Iran. There have been signs of a lot of discontent with the government in Iran, but then again Saddam was very unpopular and that didn't stop a serious insurgency from forming fairly quickly.
The Article on the (overrated) Impact of drohnes would be something I am looking forward to. As far as I understand the Ukraine war, the Impact of drohnes there seams to be massive.
This assumes that most or all Iranians support the Mullah theocracy. My best guess is that the only demographic that is pro-Ayatollah is male, rural, uneducated - so perhaps 20% of the population.
I don't think the U.S. would (or should) fight on the land. Destroying the oil ports, nuclear facilities, and Iranian naval assets would be sufficient.
Never in history has an economic strike alone been enough to defeat an enemy. The economic/logistical strike opens up a window of opportunity to exploit, but if the exploitation never happens, it is basically wasted.
Great analysis. One omission though is where to get the sealift to run the logistics of operating the equivalent of the entire US military in Iran. That may well be the biggest Achilles heel.
I'm going to be covering that in the Wargaming a conflict with Russia series.
Given an Iranian invasion would be mostly IBCTs there's less need for that than you might think. Particularly if they can use Turkey or Iraq to mount the invasion, as they have about 8 brigades worth of equipment already in Europe (which can get to Turkey by Rail) and Kuwait. IBCTs can be flown into theatre by C-17.
The terrain in Iran's north west along Turkey is mountainous. Staging in Turkey will be inefficient. The axis into Iran from Turkey is full of choke points, and would lead to a logistical tail vulnerable to interdiction and harrassment.
Looking forward to it!
Due to Iran's rugged terrain, they rely on a relatively small number of transit chokepoints, if these are severed it will greatly complicate their ability to move supplies and manpower around. Worth doing an analysis of this. It features strongly in the US militaries war plans for any potential conflict with Iran
Simplicius did a good write up of the Iraq war myth
https://open.substack.com/pub/simplicius76/p/the-iraq-war-was-a-sham
anyone know the origin of 3:1?
Operational research of historical conflicts is pretty consistent at giving you the 3:1 ratio.
But that’s at the tactical level. At the operational level a 1.3:1 ratio is fine.
was just curious of origins.
Most countries maintain what are called operational research departments. They turn historical information from past conflicts into data sets in order to run statistical analysis.
The first big thing that almost all of them arrived at was the 3:1 ratio at the tactical level.
Thier work is usually classified when covering more recent conflicts. So for instance, US operational data analysis from the 1973 Yohm Kippur War is just starting to be available, but 100% the Pentagon is currently very busy crunching the numbers from Ukraine.
Though I think early versions of the 3:1 ratio show up in Clausewitz and Jomanie
Whilst the fallout from this sort of operation would be catastrophic globally, on one level, I would love to see them try. I cannot think of a swifter method of bringing the US Empire and it’s Zionist entity colony down in a matter of months. Go for it USA, I say. - make our day! 👍
I think it might be optimistic to assume the same force quality ratio as 1991 against Iraq. And equally, to assume the same morale level of the defenders.
The endless parade of ramp ceremonies will make for entertaining television, if nothing else.
Donny should go for it, it would be doubly interesting to see Israel pasted from end to end with "dirty bomb" hypersonics in reply.
Invasion is the easy (ish) bit - the real question is what is done when you win and then own a country descending into chaos. I wonder if there are any recent examples of this…
Thanks for the interesting and informative article. The force ratio discussion was especially useful. The 1:3 rule often used simplistically, and the article does a good job of explaining it. Looking forward to the next article.
Great analysis. However the drohne cemtric war in Ukraine seems to favour the defender as maneuvering becomes very hard when your enemy sees every move and can strike everything he sees. How do you see the influence of this on the calculation?
Second question: To defeat Iran, the US would also have to occupy significant parts of it. When you take 20 solidiers for each 1000 civilians under occupation the 90 Millions inhabitants of Iran would need an occupation force of 1.8 Million solidiers, which is way out of the capabilities of US military. How would this play out?
Those both point to the asymmetric aspect of Iran's national defense strategy. I generally think the impact of drones is overrated for reasons that would take a whole separate article to cover.
Whether the insurgency strategy would work depends a lot on how well national will to resist survives in the occupied parts of Iran. There have been signs of a lot of discontent with the government in Iran, but then again Saddam was very unpopular and that didn't stop a serious insurgency from forming fairly quickly.
The Article on the (overrated) Impact of drohnes would be something I am looking forward to. As far as I understand the Ukraine war, the Impact of drohnes there seams to be massive.
This assumes that most or all Iranians support the Mullah theocracy. My best guess is that the only demographic that is pro-Ayatollah is male, rural, uneducated - so perhaps 20% of the population.
I don't think the U.S. would (or should) fight on the land. Destroying the oil ports, nuclear facilities, and Iranian naval assets would be sufficient.
Never in history has an economic strike alone been enough to defeat an enemy. The economic/logistical strike opens up a window of opportunity to exploit, but if the exploitation never happens, it is basically wasted.
I'm sure that's accurate, but the U.S. Army is not going to Teheran.
Do PANAMA and CANADA next!
The best Canada one so far was by Binkov: https://youtu.be/dOS_0CMOqyg?feature=shared
Just wait until you have to face the Canadian Rangers!