Interesting genesis of small unit tactics - I wonder how well co-ordinated they were with division level artillery, and were these developments matched by innovations in communications and battlefield awareness? How long did First World War armies have to wait for improvements in ‘combined arms’ doctrines to materialise?
In WW1 divisional artillery coordination on the offence wasn't really possible due to issues with communications. The only reliable means of communication at the tactical level until late 1918 was the field phone, which for obvious reasons works well on the defence and almost not at all on the offence.
Artillery coordination really consisted of timetables for a series of targets (usually a creeping barrage) and then extensive rehearsal so that the infantry could keep up with the artillery's timetable. You get around this with reliable tactical voice radios, but those didn't really exist until about 1944.
Combined arms doctrine without tanks is essentially in place by 1916. The fires effective combined arms operation with tanks is generally considered to be Cambrai in in spring 1917.
What’s next on the subject list? Continuing with WW1 (equivalent German, Russian, Aussie, Canadian tactical developments) or marching on towards the mid century?
The next free article goes into more detail about the platoon tactics that emerged in 1916-17, and then explains the training and equipment challenges they created.
The next paid article will be about the US Navy's sealift capability in the context of a possible war with Russia.
One legacy of the four-section rifle platoon is that the fire-teams in rifle sections are still ‘Charlie’ and ‘Delta’: the third and fourth in the order of battle, and those which remain after the bombers and machine gunners (‘Alpha’ and ‘Bravo’) were later detached and collected in support company.
Fascinating analysis, the casualty ratios from 1 Jul onwards are a real marker of how effective evolving doctrine can be. Thank you.
Find the picture of how the new small unit organisation work suppressing a strong point very useful as normally these groups are talked about but their actual use is too abstract to really internalise. Think a good article would be taking different small unit tactics or organisations and how they respond to similar situations (granted there's probably a point that each would have a different set of situations give the dialectics of combat). Just throwing out there if it seems interesting.
Good article overall, interesting pushback to the cultural position the Somme represents in the British discourse
Interesting genesis of small unit tactics - I wonder how well co-ordinated they were with division level artillery, and were these developments matched by innovations in communications and battlefield awareness? How long did First World War armies have to wait for improvements in ‘combined arms’ doctrines to materialise?
In WW1 divisional artillery coordination on the offence wasn't really possible due to issues with communications. The only reliable means of communication at the tactical level until late 1918 was the field phone, which for obvious reasons works well on the defence and almost not at all on the offence.
Artillery coordination really consisted of timetables for a series of targets (usually a creeping barrage) and then extensive rehearsal so that the infantry could keep up with the artillery's timetable. You get around this with reliable tactical voice radios, but those didn't really exist until about 1944.
Combined arms doctrine without tanks is essentially in place by 1916. The fires effective combined arms operation with tanks is generally considered to be Cambrai in in spring 1917.
What’s next on the subject list? Continuing with WW1 (equivalent German, Russian, Aussie, Canadian tactical developments) or marching on towards the mid century?
The next free article goes into more detail about the platoon tactics that emerged in 1916-17, and then explains the training and equipment challenges they created.
The next paid article will be about the US Navy's sealift capability in the context of a possible war with Russia.
One legacy of the four-section rifle platoon is that the fire-teams in rifle sections are still ‘Charlie’ and ‘Delta’: the third and fourth in the order of battle, and those which remain after the bombers and machine gunners (‘Alpha’ and ‘Bravo’) were later detached and collected in support company.
Fascinating analysis, the casualty ratios from 1 Jul onwards are a real marker of how effective evolving doctrine can be. Thank you.
Find the picture of how the new small unit organisation work suppressing a strong point very useful as normally these groups are talked about but their actual use is too abstract to really internalise. Think a good article would be taking different small unit tactics or organisations and how they respond to similar situations (granted there's probably a point that each would have a different set of situations give the dialectics of combat). Just throwing out there if it seems interesting.
Good article overall, interesting pushback to the cultural position the Somme represents in the British discourse